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The Decline of U.S.
Manufacturing Employment—
Automation and Trade
Susan N. Houseman
ARTICLE HIGHLIGHTS
 U.S. manufacturing
experienced unprecedented
employment declines
in the 2000s.
 Strong output and
productivity growth in
manufacturing are often
cited as evidence that U.S.
manufacturing is doing
well and that automation
is primarily responsible for
the employment declines.
A careful look at the
evidence does not support
this popular view.

This article is based on “Understanding the
Decline in Manufacturing Employment”
(Houseman 2018).
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The manufacturing sector experienced a
precipitous and historically unprecedented decline
in employment in the 2000s, which coincided
with a surge in imports, weak growth in exports,
and a yawning trade deficit. The sharp job losses
in manufacturing significantly contributed to the
weak employment growth and low labor force
participation characterizing the U.S. economy for
much of this period.
The plight of U.S. manufacturing featured
prominently in the 2016 presidential election, with
candidates Donald Trump and Bernie Sanders
arguing that globalization had severely damaged
U.S. factories and workers. That message resonated
in many American communities and helped
propel Trump to the presidency. Making good on
campaign promises, the president pulled out of the
Trans-Pacific Partnership agreement, has proposed
renegotiating the North American Free Trade
Agreement, and most recently has threatened high
tariffs on Chinese imports, raising concerns about
a trade war.
An alternative view, which many economists
embrace, holds that automation, not globalization,
largely explains manufacturing’s relative
employment declines and, in recent years, steep job
losses. As evidence, proponents of this view point
to statistics showing robust output growth and
much higher productivity growth in manufacturing
relative to the aggregate economy. This perspective
often is presented as the consensus view among
economists and taken as fact in media reports.
The view, however, reflects a misreading of
the data. Although automation is occurring in
manufacturing, as in other sectors of the economy,
neither the descriptive nor the research evidence
supports the view that automation was the leading
cause of the relative and absolute decline in
manufacturing employment in the 2000s.

The Collapse of Manufacturing Employment in
the 2000s
Manufacturing employment trended upward in
the years following World War II, peaking at over
19 million in 1979. From 1979 to 1989, the year
of the next business cycle peak, manufacturing
shed 1.4 million jobs, or 7.4 percent of its base,

Rapid productivity growth in
the computer industry—and, by
extension, the strong productivity
growth in manufacturing—largely
reflects improvements in high-tech
products, not automation.
with job losses concentrated in the primary metals
and textile and apparel industries. Employment in
manufacturing was relatively stable in the 1990s.
Manufacturing employment plunged in the
2000s. Between the business cycle peaks of 2000
and 2007, the sector’s employment dropped by 3.4
million, or 20 percent. Although employment in
manufacturing, a cyclically sensitive sector, often
drops sharply during recessions, the early 2000s
marked the first time that employment in the
sector did not entirely or largely recover during the
expansion. Manufacturing employment was hardhit again during the Great Recession of 2008–2009,
rebounding only slightly during the ensuing
recovery. In total, since 2000, manufacturing
employment has fallen by nearly 5 million, or over
28 percent. Unlike the declines experienced in
the 1980s, the job losses have been broad-based,
affecting all industries.
Widespread plant closures accompanied
the employment declines. From 2000 to 2014,
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the number of manufacturing
establishments dropped by more than
78,000, a 22 percent decline.
The Puzzle
Reflecting stable or declining
employment in the manufacturing
sector, the share of private sector
employment in manufacturing has
dropped steadily, and relative declines
have been particularly prominent since
the 1980s. Manufacturing employment
as a share of private sector employment
peaked at 35 percent in 1953; by 2016,
that share had fallen to just under
10 percent. Manufacturing’s share of
private sector GDP has experienced
a parallel decline: manufacturing’s
contribution to private sector GDP
peaked at 33 percent in 1953, and by
2016 its share was just 13 percent.1 The
trends in these shares, depicted in the
right scale of Figure 1, suggest that
performance in the manufacturing
sector has been weak relative to the rest
of the economy.
Figure 1 also shows indices for
the private sector and manufacturing
real (inflation-adjusted) GDP on the

left scale. Paradoxically, in view of
manufacturing’s declining employment
and GDP shares, real GDP growth in
manufacturing has largely kept pace
with that of the private sector overall.
Only since the Great Recession has real
output growth been noticeably slower
in manufacturing than in the aggregate
economy.
Reconciling Manufacturing’s
Declining Shares with Robust
Output Growth
How can these apparently
contradictory trends be reconciled? If
real GDP growth for manufacturing
has kept pace with real GDP growth
in the aggregate economy yet
manufacturing’s share of private sector
GDP is falling, it must be the case that
prices of manufactured goods have
grown more slowly than the average
growth in prices of goods and services
in the economy.
Similarly, manufacturing’s declining
share of private sector employment
results because manufacturing
employment is growing more slowly
than the average for the private sector.

Figure 1: Manufacturing and Private Industry Real GDP; Manufacturing GDP and Employment Shares
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SOURCE: Author’s calculations using data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis.
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The relationships between labor,
GDP, and productivity growth may
be expressed as a simple accounting
identity, which shows that the
difference in the growth rates of labor
employed in the aggregate private
sector and in manufacturing is equal to
the difference in their real GDP growth
rates less the difference in their labor
productivity growth rates.2
If manufacturing’s real GDP
growth rate is approximately the
same as the average for the private
sector, as indicated in Figure
1, then all, or virtually all, of
manufacturing’s declining employment
share is accounted for by higher
labor productivity growth. Many
economists have taken the patterns
shown in Figure 1, and related
descriptive evidence, to infer that
the higher productivity growth in
manufacturing—implicitly or explicitly
assumed to reflect automation—
has largely caused the relative and
absolute declines of manufacturing
employment. Even when some role for
trade is recognized, it is deemed small,
and the decline is taken as inevitable.3
Broadly, there are two problems
with this conclusion. First, the
descriptive evidence is misleading
and has been widely misinterpreted.
The low growth in prices, strong real
output growth, and high productivity
growth in manufacturing are largely
driven by one industry—computer
and electronic products (hereafter
computer industry)—and reflect the
statistical adjustment of price deflators
of computers and semiconductors for
improvements in product quality.
Second, as researchers widely
recognize, accounting identities and
other descriptive evidence per se
cannot be used to draw inferences
about the causes of the relative and
absolute decline in manufacturing
employment. Productivity growth
does not by itself cause employment
reductions and may reflect many
forces, including import competition
and offshoring.
I discuss each problem in turn.
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Figure 2: Real GDP, Private Industry and Manufacturing, with and without Computer Industry
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The Outsized Effect of the Computer
Industry on Manufacturing Statistics
Many of the products produced in
the computer industry have undergone
substantial and rapid technical
advances. The semiconductors
embedded in our electronics, for
example, are much more powerful
today than they were a decade or even
a year ago. Likewise, the computers
and related devices that consumers
and businesses buy today have much
greater functionality than in the past.
The statistical agencies account for the
rapid improvements in product quality
in the industry through adjustments
to price deflators; for some products,
adjusted prices have declined rapidly
over time.
Adjusting product price deflators
in the computer industry for
improvements in product quality, in
turn, has large effects on the industry’s
measured real GDP and productivity
growth. Although the computer
industry has always accounted for
less than 15 percent of value-added
in manufacturing, because of its
extraordinary measured real GDP and
productivity growth, it has an outsized
effect on measured real output and
productivity growth in the sector,
skewing these statistics and giving a
misleading impression of the health of
American manufacturing.
Figure 2 displays indices of
real GDP in the private sector and
manufacturing, as published and
omitting the computer industry. The
computer industry has had large
effects on measured real GDP growth
in manufacturing since the 1980s.
From 1979 to 2000, measured real
GDP growth in manufacturing was
97 percent of the average for the
private sector; when the computer
industry is dropped from both
series, manufacturing’s real GDP
growth rate is just 45 percent that of
the private sector average. Between
2000 and 2016, real GDP growth in
manufacturing was 63 percent of
the average private sector growth.
Omitting the computer industry from
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each series, manufacturing’s measured
real output growth is only about 0.2
percent per year and just 12 percent of
the average for the private sector in the
2000s. Without the computer industry,
measured real output in manufacturing
was lower in 2016 than in 2007 at
the start of the Great Recession.
In addition, without the computer
industry, labor productivity growth was
no higher or only somewhat higher
in manufacturing than in the private
sector overall (Houseman 2018).
Once the anomalous effects of
the computer industry are excluded,
descriptive data no longer provide
prima facie evidence that higher
rates of automation were primarily
responsible for the long-term decline in
manufacturing’s share of employment.
Rather, they suggest that understanding
the reasons for the slow output growth
in manufacturing output is critical.
It is also important to recognize
that the rapid productivity growth
accompanying output growth in
the computer industry has little to
do with automation—production
of computers and semiconductors
has been automated for many years.

Rather, rapid productivity growth
in the industry—and, by extension,
the strong productivity growth in
manufacturing—largely reflects
improvements in high-tech products.
Nor is the rapid growth in measured
computer and semiconductor output
a good indicator of the international
competitiveness of domestic
manufacturing of these products.
As detailed in Houseman, Bartik,
and Sturgeon (2015), the locus of
production of these products has been
shifting to Asia, even as the industry
was driving the apparent robust growth
in the manufacturing sector.
Interpreting productivity growth
Labor productivity is measured
as real GDP (the returns to capital
and labor) divided by labor input
(hours worked or employment).
Labor productivity will increase if
processes are automated—that is, if
businesses invest in capital equipment
and that equipment substitutes for
workers in the production process.
Measured growth in labor productivity,
however, captures many factors
besides automation. As just discussed,

3
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the strong productivity growth in
the manufacturing sector has been
driven by productivity growth in the
computer industry, which largely stems
from product improvements owing to
research and development.
In addition, manufacturers have
outsourced many activities previously
done in-house, either to domestic or
foreign suppliers, or have shifted their
input sources to lower-cost, often
foreign, providers. If the outsourced
activities are primarily done by
relatively low-paid workers, or if the
outsourced labor is cheaper than
the in-house labor, measured labor
productivity will increase. Shifting
to lower-cost input sources will
raise measured productivity as well
(Houseman et al. 2011).
International competition also
may directly impact measured
manufacturing productivity by
affecting the composition of products
produced and processes used in
the United States. The industries
and plants within industries most
affected by increased competition
from low-wage countries will likely
be the most labor-intensive, raising
measured labor productivity. For
example, case study research on the
impact of the wave of Asian furniture
imports in the early 2000s shows
that plant closures and employment
declines were concentrated in the most
labor-intensive furniture industries,
and within industries less affected
by imports, the most labor-intensive
processes were offshored.4
Productivity growth surged in
some manufacturing industries during
the early 2000s, a period marked by a
precipitous decline in manufacturing
employment and factory closures. A
superficial reading of the data might
lead one to conclude that productivity
in the form of automation caused
the relative and absolute declines
in manufacturing employment. Yet
given the massive structural change
occurring at the time, accelerated
productivity growth may largely reflect
changes in the composition of products

4

produced and processes done in the
United States, and may have largely
been a consequence of international
trade.
Discussion
The aggregate manufacturing
output and productivity statistics,
dominated by the computer industry,
mask considerable weakness in most
manufacturing industries, where real
output growth has been much slower
than in the private sector overall
since the 1980s and has been anemic
or declining since 2000. Because
manufacturing has deep supply chains
and accounts for a disproportionate
share of R&D in the economy, the
health of manufacturing industries has
important implications for employment
and output growth and innovation
in the economy. Understanding the
causes of the decline is necessary for
developing sensible policy responses.
The prevailing view that automation
largely caused the swift relative and
absolute declines in U.S. manufacturing
employment in the 2000s reflects a
misinterpretation of the numbers.
Moreover, the automation view is not
backed by rigorous research. Studies
have failed to find that automation was
a significant cause of the precipitous
decline in manufacturing employment
in the 2000s. And while industrial
robots may have the potential
to displace many workers in the
future, any effects on manufacturing
employment to date are small.
A large and growing body of
research has also examined the effects
of trade on domestic manufacturing
in the 2000s. No study captures all
aspects of globalization and its effects
on manufacturing and aggregate
employment, and the limitations of any
individual study need to be recognized.
Collectively, however, the research
points to sizable adverse effects from
trade on employment, output, and
investment.5 The denial by many in
both the Republican and Democrat
parties of globalization’s significant role
in manufacturing’s recent employment

declines has inhibited much-needed,
informed debate over trade policies.
NOTES
1. GDP, also called value added, reflects the
contributions an industry or sector makes to
output from its labor and capital.
ሶ ் െ ܲܦܩሶ ெሶ ሻ
2. Formally, ் ܮሶ െ ܮெሶ ൌ ሺܲܦܩ
െ ሺܲ݀ݎሶ ் െ ܲ݀ݎሶ ሶ ெ ሻ, where the T and M
subscripts indicate the total private and
ሶ , and ܲ݀ݎ
ሶ ሶ
manufacturing sectors, and ் ܮ,ሶ ܲܦܩ
represent the growth rates in labor, GDP,
and labor productivity, respectively.

3. See, for example, DeLong, Brad. 2017.
“NAFTA and Other Trade Deals Have Not
Gutted American Manufacturing—Period.”
Vox Media. I provide additional citations in
Houseman (2018).
4. See Holmes, Thomas J. 2011. “The Case
of the Disappearing Large-Employer
Manufacturing Plants: Not Much of a
Mystery After All.” Economic Policy Paper
11-4. Minneapolis, MN: Federal Reserve
Bank of Minneapolis.
5. I provide an overview and citations
to studies on automation and trade in
Houseman (2018).
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